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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. REAL, 
Plaintiff and Appellunl, 
.\L.\L\ l•:. I'O\VELL nnd 1\L\W;ARE'J' 
E. PO'Nl•:LL, hi;; wife, 
Drfendaul> u11r/ H1 -'')!0mlc,tts. 
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C.C.A. 1953. 
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POINT II. 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U,C.A. 1953, IMPOSE 
AN UNREASONABLE BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COM-
:\lERCE AS APPLIF:D TO THE CONDU.CT AND ACTIVITIES 
01" UNION. 
POINT III. 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE UN-
CONSTITUTIO~AL CNDER THE DCE PROCESS AND 
EQl:AL PROTECTION CLAl.'SES OJ<' THE FEDERAL COX-
STlTL'TlON AS APPLIED TO THE FA-CTS OF THIS CASE. 
POINT IV. 
SECS. 61-2-1, 62-2-2 AND 6-2-18, UCA 1953, AS THEY 
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE ARE UNCONSTI-
TCTIONAL AS BEING IK VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. 
ARGLHEXT 
POINT I. 
THE ACTIVITIES OF PLAINTIFF'S ASSIGNOR, 
CNION, DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF 
"REAL ESTATE BROKER," CONTAINED IN SEC. 61-2-2, 
U.C.A. 1953. 
On Page 0 of respondent',<; brief, it i~ stated that the 
adiviti~'~ of l'nion l'llll~i~l ol' thl' following: 
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(1) It lis(.~ or att~·liJjil~ to lid real estate 
(:2) Ir adverti~e~ real P~tate 
(31 H a~~i::;t~ or dirw·t~ in the proc·nring of pr%-
pects ealculnlo..•d to result in the ::mle of real estate. 
\hth re;;pert to (1) ahow, t.he 11or·d ·•Jist~-, haH a 
definite meaning in the real e~tatP indu.~try a::; denoting 
the tt<.:r:c:plnnc·c~ of a :;ellc·t··~ propo~al to ~ell his real prop-
,•rt:· and to endeavor to find purehast"l'H fl>l' it. This 
Union did nol atkttlpl l.o do, anfl the ~lau_·rtt{·rrt in re-
~pondent>~' brief that it did flie::< in the face of the .stipu-
lation oi fad~ in thi~ en~e wher·e lhat II'Ord 11a~ stritkt·n 
out and initialed h:- attorney~ for the parties for the very 
rea~on that L'nion did 110l undertake ot· cudeavor to find 
any purcha~en< for advf'rti~Pr·~ property hut agreed only 
to perfo 1'111 the advP t'l i~ing ;;l'rvire~ eontraded I' rom which 
prospective pun·ha~er~ might contart the advertising 
~ellerdirec·tly (]{..10,11). 
A~ to (~)above, ;;w:h activity i~ not defined a~ a real 
estate broker under any of tlw italieized phu~t·~ of that 
section fls it ftli[ICar:> on rc~poudc•nt'~ brief except to lh,• 
extent that "or u~;;i;;ts or directs in the pro\'nring ol· pro~­
pects" lilerall.\ L'W"\)IIIpu~~e~ thi:; nnd 111any other arti\·i-
tic~. (::!) ahove, of roume, rui~P:-< tlw ~ame C[UPstiou. Thn~, 
011 thi,; point, this ·Court i,; agn.in fnrni~lwd IYith the pmlo. 
lf1n it had he fore in the A..11dn ,oil t·a~~~ when• it wa~ held 
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that those words are not tu be given literal application. 
Respondent~ endeavor to distinguish that case. Surely, 
however, one who, ·without a license, pcr~onally con-
tacts pro:>pective ,;ellers for a real estate broker is 
assisting to some extent in procuring of prospects. ~'o 
the extent that there is a difference in degree, appellant 
fmbmits that the ar-tivi1 if'~ of l'nion's agens are more re~ 
!note than that of the plaintiff in tl1e And a son ease. The 
distinction as to what assistance brings one within the 
terms of the suhjed section made in thai case is "those 
whil'lt n'sult )II legal liability between the parties." Cer-
tainly nothing the agent of T~nion doe,; in any way effects 
legal liability between any buyer and seller any more than 
the activities of the 8tcnographer or man who introduoos 
the real estate broker do. 
POINT II. 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, L".C.A. 1953, IMPOSE 
AN UNREASONABLE BGRDEN ON INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE AS APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND ACTIVITIES 
OF UNION. 
Appellant rlnr~ not take i,;~m· 11·ith t1Je authorities 
\·ited bY respondent undt>r this point but contends that 
they do not have any applieation to our case. It i~ idle to 
~a.1· that tlwrP i.,; no interference (or that the intcrferenct-
i~ in\·onsequential) 11 ith an admittedly intrr~tate acti\·ity 
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of publishing and advertising heeau,;e the latlN are not 
prohibited (and could not l1e ~im:t· tl1e:· are done out~idc 
the ~tak) when burdens are placed upon the proer11·ing 
of advertiser~ 11 hi<·h 1nake,; it difl'ienlt or iHlpOP~ihlt> to 
~u~tain the publication since advt>rii~ing eontratb a 1'1' 
the sole source ol' n•renue I'll" ~neh un enterprise. 
Hespondcnts' ati<>IIIJ!I~ In dii:iting·trif'h tlu• ra;;eE of 
l'tuli L'. i'·,'a./t Lake TriiJIIIW Publi,,fiill(/ Company and l'oo·t 
f'riuliniJ awi Publislii·u:J Cuiilf!Uii.IJ r. ffrew.~ter on the 
g-round that the legislation there prohibiteU the adYertis-
ing it~ell ackno11IPrlgb t.lmt Ow ~tah• ,-,mid not din~rtly 
Jlrohibit circulation of the advertising in question. Is it 
an.v more Ia ll'i'ul to prevent ~1wh ci rr·ulal ion by preventing 
the solicitation of the advertising matter to be circulated! 
II' one tna: la\\'fully pniJli~lt and c·irculate advertising, 
why may he not a.ssernble the material I 
l~eO:]JOndents contend that the requirements for 
Fnion\ agent,; to l1nalil'y as real estate brokerR are nut 
unreasonable. Appellant ask,; why should it be neee~sary 
to pa~s an examination in real e~tate Ja,,·, a('qui.~ition 
of titles, deeds, leases, mortgages, land eon I 1·:wL~, agency 
contracts, licnii, ;-;oning, taxation, aud the pro\""isions of 
Chapter fil, L:.C.A. HJ;J:1, for one who ~oli(·it>< l'rom pros-
Jlectivc ~ellcrs tlte bu~in('>~-~ of advel"ti~ing· their prop1:rt.1· .' 
ne~pondenl~ have failed to sugge~t \l·iLy rotupetency in 
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~uch real e;;iate detaiL; should be TJeccs:;ar·y for adverti~­
ing the propertic~ fO!' sak. lles1)0ndcnb, further, omit 
entirely any rei'erencc to the provision::; of Section 61-2-(i 
which also require,.; of rwr><om; who are not Jicen8ed real 
e~tate hroker·~ of' otl11_.r ~tates who have reciprocal laws 
and maintain a place of bminess there: (l) 3 years fX-
pcrience as a real estate salesman or its equivalent, (2) 
maintaining a place of lmsiness here (3) personal knowl-
edge recommendations a;; to character by three Utah 
property owners. 
POINT III. 
SECS. 61-2-1, 61-2-2, AND 61-2-18, U.C.A. 1953, ARE U)f-
CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE DCE PROCESS MW 
EQUAL PROTECTIO::->f CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION AS APPLIED TO THE FA-CTS OF THIS CASE. 
Appellant contend~ that it i~ unconstitutional for a 
legi8lature to arbitrarily define an advertiser a~ a real 
e~tate broker or· salesman. Apparently, respondents do 
not disp.ute the fact that See. 61-:.l-2 hru; done thlli to the 
extent it includes the actiYitie~ of rnion. Further, re. 
spondents have not taken i~sue with appellant\ brief that 
this can not Le done comistcntl.1 with constitutional 
principles. 
Appellant docs not argue that real estate brokers 
JJIH.I not be regulated or that the twtiYities of rnion may 
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not be regulated "c•un::;i::;tentl;.- with constitutionallimita-
t . " lOll~. \Yhat appellanl dnt·~ t·onlend i:; that Union can 
not be regulawd in the :;ame manner that a rca\ e~late 
broker may be constitntionall.1 l"t·t-;ulat.cd 11ilf'n Lnion i~ 
not a real L·~tate broker and that it is unconstitutional 
to define one as a real estatr• brokc1· ll'ho i~ not one in 
fact. 
Respondent::; contend that the Xe11r England eases ur 
[:niter/ Interclwnge, Inc. v. Spellacy and I ·,lited lnter-
c/,an_(Je. /w;, o/ .lfos.wu:lwse/1., 1. Hort!illff.· failed to take 
note of tlw potential harm to the public from actiYilie~ 
~uch as T"nion. 'l'hi~ i:; a pi'IO~utnptiou:; ;;tatL'IHtnt and not 
in accordance with the fact. In United luterchrwge v. 
Spellacy the Connecticut :-lupl'cwc Court said: 
·"l'he onb reason advan~ed for the nerd and 
design of this anwndmPnt i~ to }JI'('\'l'nt fraud. a 
purpos(· 1rhid1 has always IJeen considered legiti-
mate for the cxt•rci~e of police pm1er when the 
facts warranted it (citing eases). A legitimatr 
purpose, however, can not justi 1\ an unreaf!onalJk 
and unnecessarib· arbitrary di~nirninator;; 
method of aecomplishing it (citing ea~e::;). 
"The legislative pom:r· to regulate a busine~~ 
fraug-ht \\'ith particular danger to the pul1li<• i~ 
nmeh \\·ider than in the case of an ot·dinary Ja,,·ful 
busineo:s ~urh ao: advertising. 'In the one busine~~ 
no riti11en has an ahsoluk right to eJlgt~!j'(•; in Ute 
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other all r·itizen~ l1ave a right and and f''Jilal right 
to engage. 'l'hc differt'nce i~ vitaL' (State v. Con-
lor!, G5 Conn. -t7b, -1-%, 33, J19) \Vherc the Lusi-
nes~ is a la\l'i'ul one 1md involves no part.iculal' 
danger to thE' publi" tht• regulation must not be 
unreasonably in exec~~ of what is nece~."IV\" to 
. . 
accomplish the suppo:>ed end; and in the t'ase or 
a bu.~ine~~ in '' hid1 all citizens havoe a right and 
an equal right to engage, the principle of ertuality 
of right~ mu~t in this starr he observed. (Statr 
v. Porter, 94-l'onn. 639, G4:l, 11A ;)9; 30 ~\111. Jur. 
378, 40) ,, 
ln order to i·oJJstitute a reasonable cxcrcMe of the 
police power, there must be a reasonable connection be-
tween the requirements of ihe law and the purpose to be 
achieved by it. In thi~ ca:-;e the purpose ostensibly would 
be to prevent misrepresentations concerning selling of 
such advNtising. Are these requirements rcasrmably 
calculated to aeliievc sm•h purpose or arc they eakulated 
to prevent such busine~s -! Fraudulent sales are ju~t as 
likely and possible in many other fields and the equal 
protection clause ,,·ould n•quire that all prrwns similarly 
situated would be treated like\\·ise. 
'l'he snppo~ed danger t·nn adcquatel: be taken care 
of as in the normal cast' of fraud, a defen:-;e a~.<(•rted b~· 
tlw respondent~ in thi~ r-n~P. The advertising fee i~ not 
pnynbl" until af/cr tl1c' ~t'tTin·~ lntn• been pcrfonm~d anrl 
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tltc• adn·rti~1·r need not rely ~olely on the good faith of 
T:nion a::; respondents a~:;c~J·t. 
l'ndi·t· thi~ voint, r'""pondrnt"' have made no attempt 
t<> Clllltf'nd that U:< appliecl to rnion, See. Gl-:!-~. l_~.C.A. 
l!J."1:;, define·~ n~ a real t·~talc' hroker a party who i~ not 
~n1•1i. Thev concede that ~uch aetivitiL·~ ''tUT TWl precif'ely 
identical 1vith lhe {'Ottnnonly accephcd fnndion~ of real 
e<tate broker or ~alesman under a trade ot ,-oJtmwrcial 
dt·l'inition." Xot only nrr tllPy not precisely identical 
but m·e not in an~- 1nt~- ,,·itltin an_, m·c•eptablc derinition 
ul' what eon~lilntb a real P"tate broker. Respondent:> 
haw (·ited no rase;; ,,-hid! eonstitutionally permit a party 
being arbitrarily defined and clasf'ified in a group in 
\\'hich he in fact does not belong. In TVI1ilu•111/; -c. f.'mn-
,,. " I \PI~ ''(d) ,, .. , '1('9 11- I' ·• 'd) "J" ~'1>1,-+-''-a .. __ ,.,,- ., :1 -ae.-( ... ,c,a 
statute providing for tl1e lil'ensing of eo~metologists after 
examination defined the term ·eosnwtolog_\' in ~ul'h a 
way a~ to indnde hair dressing, mas~age, and manienrinp;. 
The plaintif[ in that rase had long pradin•d as a mas~­
eu~e. The hoard rharged with administering the statute 
ordered her to eea~e 1'~'1'1\)l'miJlg- any ;wti\1' tlhtlidulog~­
until she had obtained a license. The plaintiff had never 
studied hair dn-.§inp; or manirnring, had no training or 
}ll'Oiieic•ncy in the::!l' partieuln.r hranehes ol' 1·osmetology 
a~ defined],- the ~tatute, and eonklnol Jlll~~ an examina-
tion in them. The conn held that although an aetivit_l-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
not harmful in itself might endanger the public health, 
sat'ety, and general welfare if pmctieed b.1- an inexperi-
~'need and incompetent IJer~on and, therefore, he a proper 
~ubject for regulation, a statute which prevented a per~ on 
from rarrying on the lawful occupation of masseuse un-
less she c-ould also qualify Uildcr the ;:;tatute as a hair 
Urcsser 1\·a,; an uncon::;titutional exercise of logislative 
power. A similar linf' of rea;;oning controlled the court'~ 
deci~ion in the following {'a~e~: Protll:if ~_-_ Henm, 1:2< Colo. 
16S, 176, :2~1J P. :!(d) /;)J; Rrnff r·. Summers, 76 Tdaho 
-J--iG, ±;J:!. :2~:1 I'i:2d) 1093; People r. Schaeffer, 310 Ill. 
57--1-, ~:'.(}, 143 .:\]•; :2+S; S'cully r.llallilwu, 3fi5 T11.185, 191, 
(j NE 2(d) 176; J,,fuu,ou ~_-_ F:n-in, 205 Jlinn. 84, SS, 285 
\\\' 07; People r. Rl•l()C, 197 X.Y. 1-±3. 149, 90 XE 451; 
Euu1~' c. Baldrige, :!9-t Pa. 1-±:2, 1-H A 97; Timmons r. 
.llorri.,, :271 F 7:!1, 7:27; Baker ;·. Doly. J.'j l<' :2(d) ~S1, 
SS:!. 
In the \'Pl'.l' rr.rr.nt rase of [~niiJn Interdwn!Jf t. ll'. 
A. Sawge, 3..\:2 P:2 2..\~J. thr. California Supreme Court 
ltc•ld thrrr wa~ ~nb~tantial doubt a;; to the constitution-
ality of ~lnttlli·~ prohibiting identical Rdivities of this 
appr.llant's assignor. 
POINT IV. 
S.ECS. 61-2-1, 62-2-2 AND 6-2-18, UC'A 1953, AS THEY 
APPLY TO THE F.\CT::; OF THIS C\SE ARE UNCONSTI-
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Tl:TIONAL AS RET~G IK VIOLATlO:-:f OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF FREEDOM OF '1'111:: PRBSS. 
Hespondent~' argument that there wa.s no intcrl'er-
enee with the freedoJll ul' the jJT'l'l'~ herein bceause the 
(Ttah statntf' imposh no direel re,.;traint or prohibition on 
!"nion'~ publication \1-;h effedi.vel,\· dealt with by the 
Supreme Court of Maine in the cao:e of I 'nited Inter. 
change. l11c. of Jlas::;. 1·. HunliJ,(f, in the~e word~; 
''ThE' pn",;~ can be deprived of ib liberty a.~ 
quickly b,\· pt'l'\ iou~ l'C.,;lraint,; whieh de~tro;.· ib 
source~ of revenue as by rigid eensor.ship. If by 
an arlifi(·ial licensing device the hm;iness of peti-
tioners can he curtailed or terminated, 1n· .Sl'l' no 
obstacle for l'urtber encroachment on freedom of 
the pres~ by restrictive legislative device aimerl 
at specific media or even at the whole indu~;try:' 
Surely the ~tatute in question here dRstroys Lnion 's 
sources of revenue because of the impracticality of its 
agent8 becomirJg real e~tate brokers and of fut·ni~hing 
the personal character references tCiluired by our law>~ 
of real e~tah' lJrokers. Respondent'~ brief concedes thai 
"the regulation of l:nion', adivitiP.~ 11\a_v have .some 
slight effeet on appellant',; sources of revRnne:· (Page 
13). It i~ difficult to ~N' how respondents can contend 
that the efl'rc·t on L:nion's puhlicalion and ('ireulation ol' 
its periorlicals is ~o J·r•tnotc and oh~ct!l'(• a~ to be of 110 
eonsequenee when the~· l'ail tu 1·vr·n di.~l·n,;::; the limitation 
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they would impo~e on l~nio11'~ agl_"llt with respect to pass-
in;:r: written examinations in fields unrelated to their 
activity and l'urni~hi_ng evidence from reo:idcnts a~ to 
t>~·r~onal knowledge of their agent'r; good moral character 
when ~uch agenh; almoo:t invariably are non-residents. 
ltcsponderJl.~ acknowledge that the i\laiw· ease citeU 
above is directly in point and eonlrar.\ to tlucir position 
in this ea~e. 
Although 1() l" .• J.::-l. 112:3, Constitutional Law, Sec. 
~D(8)c 111aki:~ ihc hroad slatPment that freedom of 
speech and pre6s impo~c no J"l:~lraints on governmental 
regulation ol' commercial aetivitiL·~ sueh a~ eonJHI('rt'ial 
advcdio:ing, all ol" the caReR cited for such 6tatement and 
hy respor~dentr; here deal 11 ith t1) the power of a muni-
cipality to regulate business 011 their r;treetfl ·without vio-
lating l"reedom ol" ~peech or prt6~ or (:!) power to tax 
~u\'11 bu~inP><~ actiYitiP~ .• \~ stated in the case of Pills-
ford r. Cil!! of Los Angdrl', (1:!:! P:!.-J:!.-J) the issue there 
was "the right to distribute coHllnercial advertising Juat-
lc-r~ upon vublic dn·l"l~ and thorough-fares." Xo such 
qne~tion is involnd in this ra><e. 
It i~ true that mnnicipalitie~ ma~- constitutionally 
prohibit rommereial a<"liYilit·~ carried upon higlnvays, 
.~tn·d~. or on ~id1•\\alk~ 11·ithout Yiol<ltinp: the freedom 
of "1'1'('('11 pr tJI'P~~ g1mranteed by the l'om,titntion be-
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cause streets, sidf'\ntllc~, and highways are public prop-
~r!y, and no one has a ve~ted right to do business there. 
This court in 1he ca~l' ol' ,','Iuter 1· . • '-!ult Lake City, 201i P. 
2(d) 153, carefully pointed out that the ordinance m 
rtnestion did not prohibit tl1e sale of magazines in other 
portiono: of the city than on l'l't·(ain ~pL·c·il'ied ~tr·ecl~ 
which con~titute (he congested bu~ine;;s di~triet of the 
city iu question. In thi~ case, however·, thl' n·~pondcnt:; 
contend that T-nion may not properl:· enter into the ('On-
tracts anywheTP in the State of l"tah without obtaining 
a real e8tate Lrokcr~ license. On the contrary, in the r·n.,e 
of' fJitts_tord r. Cilp of Los Angdc.,·, r·ited h.1 rc::;pondent~, 
it is stated: 
"1'he conduct of sirietly eomrnercial ael ivi 1 ic·~ 
may, under eertain circumstanre:;;, involve the 
exercise of free speech and a l'ece prei\s and under 
such circwnstance~ prohibition of certain com-
mercial practice,; might r.oJH·c·ivably be hPld io 
abridge the~c con~titutional rights .... lt does 
not follow that where an ordinance regulating or 
prohibiting the trani\action or bn:>ine~s npon the 
publie streets n1a.1· 1Je .~aid to hear a rca~onalJ!e 
relation to the public welfarP, i!Hrh an ordimmce 
may be set aside upon the ground that it en-
croache~ llpon liberty of ~pr·l·t•li and ]liP><~. Such 
libertieR in conner·tion with comn1crt·ial adivitie::; 
may ordinarily be exerci~ed in some other man liN" 
than upon the public ~treet~." 
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In the ca~e at bar, 1TTlinn·s agents were not distribut-
lllg" any commercial or mixed commercial and political 
matter upon the public Htrl•el as wa~ the party sought 
to Le enjoined in the ca~c of V(J/enliue r. Chri,;ten.'fll, 
(l'\c11 York) (i:! ~ St. 0:20, 31G r.0. ~~:2, SG L. Ed. l2U:L 
} .. IJpdlant. takes no exception to that case. 
Appellant does not. eonlend that. the arlivitie~ of 
rnion are beyond the vower of a lllUlli(·ipality or a state 
to tax. The ca~c of Rc1dxu H. Dmmelly Corp v. Cily o.f 
Hrllrr,te (K;·.) HQ ~\\" 2d lUU, which held that a. city 
may constitutionall.1· ln·.1· a tax upon circulation of com-
tnercia.l ad1·ertising without violating freedom of the 
lJlT~s ha~ no appliration to thi~ case. In short, the is~ue 
here is whether rnion must obtain a real e~tate broker's 
license in order to negotiate advertising eontracts a.ny-
1\-hcn• in tltc Slatf' of 1"tah and not whether such activi-
tit>s nmy be prohibited on public thoroughfare~ or are 
immune from taxation. 
CONCL1'Sl0::\ 
The adivities of l"nion do not come ,,·ithin the pro-
vi~ion~ of our real P~!ate licen~ing- ~tatute~. Such ~tatutf'~ 
if apjlliPd to plnintitT.:; a~signor IHE' mleon,;titutional a~ 
being· in \" iolation of tilL' c·mnmerce clau~(.', the due proeP;~ 
and '''tual pl"nkdion clau~e. and freedom of pre~s of 
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l:i 
the Federal l'on~titution. The order ot di~missal based 
on said statutes ·wu~ in error and should be Yaeated aml 
tlw case remanded to the Di;;trid Court or Salt Lake 
County l"or further proceeding;; to dPterminP the merits, 
if any, of re~pondent;;' defen>,cs ba~ed on fraud and other 
affinuative defenses. 
RespceHully ~ubrnitted, 
HOBERT B. HAKSE?\ 
H. LO"\YELL RALP II 
.l/l"ruP.I/:0: for Appellant 
G:) F:a~t 4th t:louth 
~alt I jake Cit~·, Utah 
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